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ABSTRACT: Explanations are supposed to provide us with understanding. It is common to make a distinction between 
genuine, scientific understanding, and the phenomenological, or ‘aha’ notion of understanding, where the 
former is considered epistemically relevant, the latter irrelevant. I argue that there is a variety of phenomeno-
logical understanding that does play a positive epistemic role. This phenomenological understanding involves a 
similarity between bodily sensations that is used as evidence for mechanistic hypotheses. As a case study, I will 
consider 17th and 18th century research into the mechanism behind the electric eel’s power to shock.
Keywords: Understanding; explanation; subjective; phenomenology; electric eels.
RESUMEN: Se supone que las explicaciones nos dotan de comprensión. Es habitual hacer una distinción entre compre-
sión científica, genuina, y la noción fenomenológica, o ‘ahá’, de comprensión, donde la primera se considera 
epistemológicamente relevante y esta última irrelevante. Argumento que hay un tipo de compresión fenome-
nológica que sí juega un papel positivo epistémico. Esta comprensión epistemológica conlleva cierta semejanza 
con las sensaciones corporales que se usan como evidencia de algunas hipótesis mecanicistas. Como caso de es-
tudio, consideraré la investigación en los siglos xvii y xviii del mecanismo tras la capacidad de la anguila eléc-
trica para provocar un shock.
Palabras clave: Comprensión; explicación; subjetivo; fenomenología; anguilas eléctricas.
Introduction
With the rise of the new mechanist movement, Hempel-style models that (broadly speak-
ing) equate explanation with nomic subsumption no longer enjoy the level of support they 
once did.1 The gist of this movement can be stated as follows: to explain a phenomenon, 
simply showing that the phenomenon was to be expected, given some regularities and ini-
tial conditions, is not enough. An explanation must provide understanding of the explanan-
dum phenomenon, where this understanding is achieved by describing the mechanism re-
sponsible for the phenomenon (Bechtel 2011, 536; Bechtel & Abrahamsen 2005, 430; 
Craver 2006, 372; Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000, 21; Weiskopf 2011, 329).
1 For an interesting exception, see Díez (2014).
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Although the new mechanist movement is relatively young and focuses chiefly on ex-
planation in the life sciences, its appeal to understanding is part of an older and broader de-
velopment in philosophy of science. Whereas for logical empiricists, understanding was a 
pragmatic, hence subjective notion that was of little importance to philosophy, subsequent 
generations of philosophers have increasingly looked to understanding as the (desired) 
product of scientific explanation (Salmon 1984, 259; Schurz & Lambert 1994, 109; Cush-
ing 1994, 10; Weber 1996, 1).
With this development in mind, it is tempting to say that expectability has given way 
to understanding as the aim of explanation. However, as I will shortly explain, this would 
not be entirely accurate. As Hempel noted (1965, 425-426), reference to the notion of un-
derstanding makes explanation a three-term relation between explanandum, explanans, and 
the scientist providing the explanation. Since what is understandable may differ from scien-
tist to scientist, or from community to community, this seemingly poses a threat to the ob-
jectivity of explanation. Yet Hempel acknowledged that intuitively, it feels right to say that 
a scientist seeks and provides explanations as a means of satisfying his “deep and persistent 
desire to know and to understand himself and his world” (1965, 333). Accordingly, he dif-
ferentiated between two senses of understanding, namely a psychological sense, or the ‘aha’ 
feeling we get when we grasp an explanation, and theoretical understanding, namely show-
ing that the phenomenon to be explained is an instance of a more general regularity, and 
therefore was to be expected. Although the idea of explanation as nomic subsumption has 
been largely abandoned, in section 2, I will show that Hempel’s distinction between these 
two types of understanding is still common currency in contemporary philosophy of sci-
ence, and moreover, that philosophers still share Hempel’s distinction between an objec-
tive or ‘genuine’ sense of understanding, and a subjective, psychological one. Finally, they 
also share his judgment that the latter is epistemically irrelevant.2
In this article, I will argue that the existing dichotomy between genuine, epistemically rel-
evant understanding, and subjective psychological understanding, is misleading. On the basis 
of a case study about 17th and 18th century investigations into the mechanism behind the elec-
tric eel’s capacity to stun, I will argue that the phenomenological sense of understanding has 
been unduly restricted to the ‘aha’ sense; In particular, I will argue that there is a type of un-
derstanding that, although intimately tied to the personal experience of researchers, can nev-
ertheless play an important epistemic role. This phenomenological understanding is not a 
‘feeling of satisfaction’ that results from grasping a certain explanation, but rather an insight 
that is bestowed by a direct bodily sensation. The epistemic role of this phenomenological 
type of understanding is evidential: it supports a particular hypothesis over its rivals.
Let me conclude with a brief overview. As I already remarked, in section 1, I will show 
that Hempel’s distinction between a psychological and a theoretical sense of understand-
ing, and his dismissal of the former as epistemically irrelevant, are still widely embraced 
in the literature. In section 2, I will present the case study in full, arguing that a particu-
lar type of phenomenological understanding played a positive epistemic role in discovering 
the mechanism responsible for the eel’s capacity to numb. In section 3, I will argue that this 
type of understanding escapes the dichotomy sketched above: it is neither objective, theo-
2 Of course, this is not to say that these authors believe that such understanding can never lead one to a 
correct explanation, but just that it is not a reliable indicator.
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retical understanding, nor the feeling of satisfaction we get after having grasped an explana-
tion. Finally, in section 4, I will flesh out the epistemic role that this type of phenomenolog-
ical understanding plays in the explanatory process. A short conclusion sums up the results.
1. Hempel’s legacy
As recounted in the introduction, Hempel distinguished between a psychological and a the-
oretical notion of understanding, and thought that only the latter had any epistemic impact, 
since the former is subjective in character. Of course, this judgment ties in with the general 
dominance of logical empiricism in the first half of the twentieth century. These days the in-
fluence of logical empiricism has waned considerably for a host of reasons, yet this particular 
aspect of it, namely the distinction between theoretical and psychological understanding, has 
by and large survived. Although many philosophers do feel that there are other epistemologi-
cally important notions of understanding besides theoretical understanding in the sense of ex-
pectability, they share Hempel’s dismissive verdict on the ‘aha’ sense of understanding.
Salmon for instance, has this to say about how understanding:
To understand the phenomena in the world requires that they be fitted into the general 
world-picture. Although it is often psychologically satisfying to achieve this sort of agreement 
between particular happenings and the worldview, it must be emphasized that psychological 
satisfaction is not the criterion of success. To have scientific understanding, we must adopt the 
worldview that is best supported by all of our scientific knowledge […]. The superiority of un-
derstanding based on a scientific worldview lies in the fact that we have much better reason to re-
gards that worldview as true – even though some other worldview might have more psychological 
appeal. (Salmon 1998, 76-77, original italics)
Clearly, the idea is that a psychological sense of understanding is epistemologically inferior 
to scientific understanding, since it is not a good proxy for the truth. Craver makes a simi-
lar point:
…in neuroscience, and in other sciences as well, explanations are not developed merely for the 
explainer’s intellectual satisfaction – the ineffable ‘a ha’ feeling that comes with understanding 
something. Such emotions and feelings are terrible indicators of how well someone understands 
something. (Craver 2007, 5)
Perhaps the most forceful critic of the phenomenological sense of understanding is 
J. D. Trout. He argues (2002, 2005) that such understanding is tightly bound up with 
hindsight and overconfidence biases. Trout calls this ‘counterfeit understanding’ (2002, 
215), and believes it a poor indicator of genuine understanding, since we often have the 
feeling of understanding without real understanding, and real understanding may occur 
without being accompanied by a feeling of understanding. This counterfeit understand-
ing can even be dangerous: “By prioritizing the phenomenology of understanding, philoso-
phers of science risk a fundamentally psychological notion of explanation, thereby threat-
ening its objectivity” (Trout 2005, 199).
Finally de Regt and Dieks, who have developed a contextual theory of understanding 
that focuses on intelligibility and use of theories (2005, further developed in de Regt 2009) 
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in order to rehabilitate the notion of scientific understanding, nevertheless make it very 
clear that they are not interested in the psychological sense of understanding. In a discus-
sion note about Trout’s 2002 article3, de Regt says of such subjective experience that “no-
body would want to maintain that such a feeling is either necessary or sufficient for any-
thing that deserves to be called scientific understanding […] surely they are neither an aim 
of science nor a condition for scientific understanding.” (de Regt 2004, 103-104).
These are just some examples of how Hempel’s rejection of the feeling of understand-
ing manifests itself in contemporary philosophy of science, but I think they are indicative 
of a general consensus (see Gopnik 1998 for a dissenting view however). The general state 
of affairs then is as follows. There is a genuine, objective sense of understanding provided 
by scientific explanations, and a phenomenological feeling of satisfaction that is accompa-
nied by explanations. The latter is regarded by most parties as subjective and unscientific, 
or at least a bad indicator for truth, and the major differences are on how exactly to spell 
out the former. In the rest of this article, I shall have little to say on the feeling of satisfac-
tion, nor will I make an attempt to contribute to the debate about the objective, theoretical 
notion understanding. Rather, I will argue that there is more to phenomenological under-
standing than just the ‘aha’ experience, by presenting a type of understanding that although 
phenomenological in character, does have a positive epistemic role to play.
2. Electric eels and the phenomenology of understanding
I believe that the phenomenology of understanding played an important epistemic role in 
17th and 18th century research into the mechanism behind the electric eel’s capacity to pro-
duce numbing sensations.4 Before the electric eels5 of South-America were discovered, two 
types of ‘numbing fish’ were already known in the old world: the sea Torpedo, and the Af-
rican Silurus (a catfish found in the waters of the Nile). Their mysterious power to produce 
numbing sensations in the persons handling them was already commented on in Antiquity. 
Galen attributed this numbing power to poison the fish supposedly emitted when touched.6
With the exploration of South-America in the 16th and 17th centuries, a third numbing 
fish became known: the South-American eel. This fish roused the interest of European sci-
entific community, partly because it came from exotic places like river-systems in the Ama-
3 The discussion between de Regt and Trout seems to revolve around the question whether the prob-
lems associated with the psychological notion of understanding should lead us to abandon the notion 
of understanding altogether (Trout’s view), or whether there is a notion of understanding that, al-
though not objective, is important to understand science (de Regt’s view). For the purposes of this pa-
per, this dispute is not relevant. 
4 The following case study draws upon Koehler, Finger & Piccolino (2009).
5 In the interests of taxonomical accuracy, it should be pointed out that nowadays, the Electrophorus 
Electricus is classified as a member of the knife fish group (gymnotiformes) rather than the eels – they 
were just called eels by the early explorers because of the physical similarities with European eels. Any-
way, let’s just call them eels. 
6 It is not always clear to which of the two numbing fish the early commentators were referring to. The 
Greek word νάρκη (which also means numbness) refers to both, as does the Latin word torpedo. In any 
case, the phenomenon was known and studied.
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zon, but also because the numbing sensation they produced was much more powerful than 
the previously known Torpedo and Silurus (as we now know, 600 volts as opposed to 50 and 
300 volts respectively). The first descriptions of the fish were made in the 16th century by Span-
ish administrators and officials, but gradually, more detailed accounts appeared. In the 1670s, 
French astronomer Jean Richer visited Cayenne and described his encounter with the eel:
I was even more surprised to see a three to four foot fish, similar to an eel […] that by sim-
ple touch with a finger or the tip of a stick, so numbs the arm and that part of the body closest to 
it that one remains about 15 minutes without being able to move […] I was witness to this effect 
and I felt it, having touched the fish with my finger one day when I met up with some savages. 
(Richer 1679)
We may view reports like this as constituting the first step in the process of mechanism dis-
covery, namely the identification of the explanandum-phenomenon, after which a phase of 
hypothesis generation starts (Darden 2009). And indeed, in the case of the South-Amer-
ican eel, the description of the explanandum phenomena led to much speculation among 
scholars back in Europe about the nature of the mechanism responsible for it.
According to one hypothesis, the numbing sensation was produced by animal spirits; 
according to another, it involved a biochemical process akin to fermentation. The Italian 
physician and ichthyologist Stefano Lorenzini (1678) thought that the process was me-
chanical rather than chemical. He proposed that the stunning power of the fish was due to 
the violent emission of large quantities of corpuscles that were so tiny that they penetrated 
the skin and interfered with the nerve conduction of the hand touching it – the inspiring 
idea here being that of a coiled up spring which is released upon making contact with the 
skin. His colleague Giovanni Borelli (1680-1681) latched on to the idea, but in his hypoth-
esis, the corpuscles were too large to penetrate the skin, and caused the numbness by hitting 
the hand at high speed (percussive and concussive action). René-Antoine de Réaumur on 
the other hand, said about the earlier known torpedo that it caused numbness by quickly 
changing its shape. Normally the shape was flat or concave, but upon being touched, it 
would become convex very rapidly, due to elastic action of tiny muscular fibers, causing 
numbness in the hand by nerve compression. Although de Réaumur was talking about the 
torpedo, his hypothesized mechanism was applied to the South-American eel by others 
(A llemand 1756). Finally, there is the proposal that the mechanism is electric in nature.
No shortage of hypotheses then, and in the 17th and early 18th centuries, it was by no 
means clear that the electricity hypothesis would come out on top. So how did this hypoth-
esis ultimately prevail over its many rivals? Phenomenal understanding played an impor-
tant role here.
During this period, the European scientific community became increasingly interested 
in the phenomenon of electricity. A number of spectacular experiments were carried out 
that demonstrated the electrical nature of lightning. Further experiments showed that a 
clear distinction could be made between conducive and non-conducive materials, and that 
electricity could travel at high speed through metal wires. Of particular importance was a 
development in technology: the invention of the Leyden jar in the 1740s. An early capaci-
tor, it stores static electricity between two layers of metal foil, attached to the inside and 
outside of a glass jar filled with water. The two layers of foil stop at the mouth of the bot-
tle so as not to touch each other. A metal rod through the stopper is electrically connected 
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to the inner foil to charge it. Using an electrostatic generator and keeping the outer foil 
grounded, the inner and outer surfaces receive equal but opposite charges. Bringing these 
into contact would release the charge and produce the characteristic sparks.
The invention greatly helped the study of electricity, as it was small and convenient 
enough to carry around, so that experiments could also be performed outside of the labo-
ratory, and the Leyden jar became the principal means of storing electricity across the con-
tinent. It stands to reason that scientists investigating the properties of electricity were 
highly interested in the accounts of the numbing eels coming from the colonies. However, 
they had great difficulty in obtaining live specimens. In the 18th century, the voyage was 
still long and arduous, and keeping the fish alive for such a long time proved difficult. In ef-
fect, the problem was that the necessary research facilities were located on one side of the 
Atlantic Ocean, and the eels on the other. Nevertheless, the descriptions coming back to 
Europe reminded scientists of their own experiences with electricity. What was needed was 
for someone to first touch the Leyden jar, and then travel to the colonies and touch the eels.
This is exactly what happened. The Swiss-Dutch naturalist Jean-Nicholas-Sébast-
ien Allemand, failing to obtain a live specimen, wrote to his friend Laurens Storm van ‘s 
Gravensande, a Dutch official working in the Dutch west indies, to seek out and study the 
fish. van ‘s Gravensande had previously touched the Leyden jar, and wrote back to Alle-
mand, recounting his experience:
The experiment was done with an eel called a tremble fish […] It produces the same effect as 
the electricity that I felt with you, while holding in a hand a bottle [the Leyden jar] that was con-
nected to an electrified tube by an iron wire. (Allemand 1756)
This, I would say, constitutes a clear example of phenomenological understanding: a first-
person experience that leads us to accept, or at least pursue, a hypothesis about the mecha-
nism responsible for an explanandum-phenomenon. As it is undeniably first-person, it is 
not objective, but for ‘s Gravensande, the experience must have been a compelling reason to 
pursue the electric hypothesis.
3.  How does phenomenological understanding relate to other types of understanding?
Let us now turn to the question how this type of understanding relates to other types as 
they feature in the literature. First, note that it does not fall under the heading of ‘theoreti-
cal’ or ‘scientific’ understanding. It is not expectability (Hempel), it is not based on a ‘best 
supported worldview’ (Salmon), nor does it seem to have anything to do with intelligibil-
ity and use (de Regt and Dieks). Also, there is an important difference in character between 
the first-person phenomenological, and the third-person theoretical types of understand-
ing. Consider the type of third-person understanding the new mechanists aim at. This un-
derstanding seems to develop gradually, tying in with the idea that mechanistic explanation 
consists of adding details about activities and entities to skeletal models of mechanisms, so 
that as we move from how-possibly models, via how-plausibly models, to how-actually mod-
els (Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000; Craver 2006, 2007) our understanding grows. We 
conjecture that a mechanism is (to keep with the case study) electric in nature, and then start 
investigating, trough intervention experiments, the actual mechanism. As the results of the 
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experiments confirm our hypothesis and we fill in more and more blanks of the model, the 
confidence in our hypothesis grows, so that we gradually come round to the viewpoint that 
the mechanism is electric. In contrast, the first-person psychological understanding obtained 
by touching the eel after having touched the Leyden jar, seems instantaneous, its character-
istic being more like that of a divine revelation rather than a gradual increase in confidence. 
Clearly then, we are dealing here with a different type of understanding.
Being phenomenological, does this understanding then belong to the realm of the ‘aha’ 
experience? No. Pace Trout (as quoted in the introduction), while it is a phenomenologi-
cal type of understanding, it is not some kind of feeling of satisfaction we get by grasping 
the electricity-explanation, but an insight brought on by recognizing the phenomenological 
similarity of touching the eel, to the previous experience of touching the Leyden jar. In fact, 
to put it into philosophically familiar terms, ‘what it is like to be shocked by a Leyden jar’ is 
similar to ‘what it is like to be shocked by an eel’. Of course, it is not incompatible with the 
feeling of satisfaction, and indeed, van ‘s Gravensande may well have experienced an ‘aha’ 
moment upon noting the similarity between the two sensations, but they are distinct. It 
seems that there is more to phenomenological understanding besides the ‘aha’ experience.
4. The epistemic role of phenomenological understanding
In the case of van ‘s Gravensande, we see how the phenomenological sense of understand-
ing can play a positive epistemic role. It instils in anyone who has touched both the eel and 
the Leyden jar the acute realization that the mechanism by means of which the eel pro-
duces numbness is electric. Conversely, would the experiences be phenomenologically dif-
ferent, surely this would dissuade the scientist from positing a similar mechanism.
One might wonder at this point to what extent our understanding of the mechanism 
responsible for the eel’s capacity to numb is increased by van ‘s Gravensande’s experience. 
After all, not much was known about the nature of electricity at the time. Hence, how 
much understanding is gained by the similarity of mechanisms that is inferred on the ba-
sis of the perceived similarity of sensations, is to a certain extent contingent upon scientific 
progress. It is conceivable (though perhaps historically unlikely) that the eels would have 
been discovered during the late 19th century, by which time electricity was much better un-
derstood. In that case, the phenomenal experience would have yielded a much deeper un-
derstanding.
Besides the extent of understanding bestowed by such experiences however, there is an-
other worry. As I have argued above, the epistemic role of this type of phenomenological 
understanding, is evidential: it increases (or decreases in the case of dissimilarity) our con-
fidence in a particular hypothesis over its rivals. But of course, confidence may be unwar-
ranted. The problems of hindsight and overconfidence biases Trout discusses, although tar-
geted at the ‘aha’ sense of understanding, affect phenomenological understanding as well.7 
7 See Grimm (2009) for a dissenting view. He presents some interesting evidence coming from cognitive 
psychology, which suggests that the seriousness and extent of these biases may be overstated by Trout. 
Of course, this is an empirical question that needs much more systematic attention than I can give it 
here; pending that, it is wise to take the possibility of bias seriously. 
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The hindsight bias (the ‘I knew it all along’ feeling) is traditionally established by letting 
participants in an experiment estimate the likelihood of an event in the future, and asking 
them to recall these estimates after the event occurred or failed to occur. Almost invariably, 
if the participants correctly predicted the event, they remember their estimates as higher 
than they actually were. If the prediction failed, they remember their estimates as lower 
than they were. In the case at hand, this would presumably translate into something like 
rating the degree of similarity between touching the Leyden jar and the eels before subse-
quent experiments confirmed the electric hypothesis, and recalling this rating after. While 
it is not clear how such an experiment would take place in practice, we can see that it is cer-
tainly possible that the ratings differ in the way described above. Overconfidence bias is 
demonstrated by letting people rate the confidence in their judgements, and compare the 
results with the accuracy of these judgments. The data here show that confidence routinely 
exceeds accuracy. Again, we can well imagine that in particular cases, the phenomenological 
similarity between two sensations may lead us to be overconfident in our hypothesis, even 
though in the case of the eels, that was not the case.
It should be stressed then that the phenomenological sense of understanding is not in-
fallible, and that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for explanation: it would be unwise to 
rely on phenomenological understanding alone, without combining it with other evidence. 
Indeed, in the case of the eel, the phenomenological evidence was backed up by evidence 
obtained by means of intervention experiments. For example, it was found that touching 
the eel with a wooden rod would result in a less severe shock, that if five persons held hands 
and the first touched the eel, the fifth person would be shocked less severely, etc. (Gronov 
1758). Nevertheless, it seems that a first-person experience like this can cause a scientist to 
doggedly adhere to a hypothesis, even in the face of third-person evidence against it. In the 
case of the eels, one problem was that the fish did not produce sparks, which at the time 
was considered the hallmark of electricity (the ‘electric fire’). In 1776, scientist John Walsh 
successfully drew a spark from a live specimen brought to London, and when he repeated 
the experiment before the Royal Society, this helped a great deal in persuading the scien-
tific community to accept the electric hypothesis. Another piece of third-person evidence 
against the electrical hypothesis had to do with water. It was widely believed that electric-
ity and water did not mix: electric devises such as the Leyden jar did not work under wa-
ter. Yet clearly, the eel’s capacity to numb is maintained under water. This problem was 
addressed by naturalist philosopher Henry Cavendish, who designed an artificial torpedo. 
Powered by many lowly charged Leyden jar, this artificial torpedo could produce numbing 
sensations under water, without visible sparks (Walsh 1773).
With this in mind, let us consider again Trout’s warning that “By prioritizing the 
phenomenology of understanding, philosophers of science risk a fundamentally psycho-
logical notion of explanation, thereby threatening its objectivity” (Trout 2005, 199). Does 
accepting phenomenological understanding undermine the objectivity of scientific expla-
nation? Hardly. The epistemic role of phenomenological understanding is to point us to 
a certain hypothesis. It does not in any way replace objective, third-person understanding 
procured by experiments, but rather invites us to procure such understanding in order to 
confirm or disconfirm our hypothesis. It is perfectly possible to acknowledge this role of 
phenomenological understanding without ‘prioritizing it’: I am sure that other types of 
understanding are also important. Of course, the phenomenological evidence obtained by 
researchers like van ‘s Gravensande could be mistaken, and as we have seen, the hypothesis 
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was backed up by evidence obtained from intervention experiments. As such, I do not em-
ploy a ‘fundamentally psychological’ notion of explanation. Phenomenological and theo-
retical understanding worked complementary in explaining the eel’s capacity to numb. 
Far from being a ‘terrible indicator of understanding’, or ‘threatening the objectivity of 
science’, first-person experience can play an important role in the process of mechanism 
discovery. Rather than threatening objectivity, the fact that the evidence comes from dif-
ferent domains, ranging from the phenomenological to intervention experiments, might 
be seen to lend to the electricity hypothesis what Heather Douglas (2009, 120) calls ‘con-
vergent objectivity’, or multiple strands of evidence obtained by independent techniques 
confirming the same hypothesis.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that phenomenological understanding should not be re-
stricted to merely the feeling of satisfaction one gets after grasping an explanation. This re-
striction makes us overlook other possible types of phenomenological understanding that 
can play an important part in the process of scientific explanation. The phenomenological 
understanding that guided the discovery of the mechanism responsible for electric eels to 
stun, constitutes an example of this.
If we put ourselves in van ‘s Gravensande’s position, it is hard to deny that the phe-
nomenological similarity of his two experiences, although not infallible, constituted an 
extremely powerful incentive to accept or at least pursue this particular hypothesis – a 
hypothesis that proved to be true. Therefore, although I readily acknowledge the dan-
gers of bias when it comes to phenomenological experience, I believe that this case study 
shows that there is more to phenomenological understanding than just the ‘aha’ experi-
ence.
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